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Intrusion defense system (IDS) development has been largely reactionary in nature.
This is especially troubling given that botnets are capable of compromising and controlling
thousands of computers before security professionals develop a mitigation technique. As
new exploits are created, new mitigation techniques are developed to detect infections and,
where possible, remove them. This thesis breaks from this tradition of reacting to malware.
Instead, it looks at possible malicious software models through analyzing existing defense
systems for exploitable weaknesses.
First, this thesis presents a new specialized botnet that circumvents current network
intrusion detection mechanisms. The proposed botnet coordinates external communication
among bots located within the same switched network. This model is designed to prevent
a perimeter-based IDS from adequately correlating external communication for a given
internal host. The idea is to localize botnet communication, thus enabling a portion of
the compromised systems to hide from existing detection techniques without a significant
increase in network monitoring points - an increase that currently has not been effectively
addressed.
Second, this thesis presents a prototype of an IDS that addresses the aforementioned
weakness in current IDSs. The proposed method augments existing IDSs in order to ef-
ficiently detect this new botnet specialization or “sub-botnet”. Our method has added
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lightweight monitoring points within its switched network. These points relay necessary
information back to a centralized perimeter-based IDS instance for bot detection. The IDS
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Today, the Internet is the largest tool for information exchange and commerce avail-
able to man. The cost of personal computers and network infrastructure has come down
dramatically, and this decrease in cost has allowed for the Internet to become a pervasive
component of modern culture. This global culture saturation has many positive and neg-
ative consequences; the same characteristics and capabilities that make it such a powerful
and productive tool also make it an equally destructive weapon. On the positive side, in-
dividuals have access to information, commerce, and communication in ways that were not
before possible. Due to the Internet, the phrase “the is world at your finger-tips” is true for
people all over the world. On the negative side, this globalization of a uniform information
exchange has led to increased exposure to escalating criminal acts and social defacements
within our interconnected cyberworld.
Individuals, corporations, and governments all share in the rising risks associated with
this expanding problem. Individuals are at risk, as criminals are actively engaged in the
collection of valuable personal information, such as social security numbers, credit card
numbers, bank account information, usernames, passwords, and any other confidential in-
formation that is deemed of value to the party in question. Corporations are at risk as well,
as the typical company has a database of valuable confidential information. This might
include customer information, trade secrets, and research and development data. In addi-
tion, companies may be targeted for attacks such as a denial-of-service (DoS), which, when
successful, may have a direct negative financial impact on the company and/or parties that
do business with said company. Governments run the risk of having their security breached.
These risks result from malicious software, which includes but is not strictly limited
to the software categories listed in Table 1.1. In this thesis, any references to malicious
software include the software categories and any workable combinations found in Table 1.1.
Further, in this thesis, while botnets are generally referred to specifically, they are also
part of the larger category of malicious software. For our purposes, malicious software is a
2Table 1.1. Malicious Software
Sampling of Malicious Software Categories
• Viruses • Worms • Trojans
• Rootkits • Adware • Logic Bombs
• Spyware • Key Loggers • Backdoor
• Sniffers • Phishing
program that propagates through one form or another and then carries out some malevolent
task for its creator.
A new virus comes out, developers discover a new signature for detection and a new
method for mitigation, and round and round this cycle goes. Said cycle involves other
exploitations and steps, but this is the basic idea. Each malicious software category in Table
1.1 operates on a “create-and-release” or “create-and-wait” paradigm. Thus, they have
limited usage. This mode of operation has become somewhat antiquated; what good is it to
have all these infected hosts if they are not controllable? The malicious software is created
with a specific task in mind, key logging, DDoS, spamming, phishing, etc., and typically the
task cannot be changed post-host-infection. Further, the communication channel between
the creator and the instigator is generally one way. The malicious software may engage
in some data collection task and periodically dump its information to a known host for
processing and retrieval, but this operation cannot be modified substantially if the scenario
changes. The obvious drawback is that a new malicious program must be created and
propagated each time a new functionality is needed; this paradigm has no structure or
feature to allow for an already compromised computer to merely be updated with the new
task. Thus, it is much more advantageous for a criminal to be able to dynamically adjust
the task undertaken by a set of compromised hosts. This allows one to keep a resource base
intact. So if one such criminal’s host base was previously reported at 100,000 computers for
just one attack, the host base will likely be at that level or even higher for the next attack,
barring some major mishap. This on-demand need inaugurated the age of the botnet. Thus
ended the era of some high school kid making headlines by accident, and so began the era
3of organized crime and rogue governments bending the seemingly limitless power of the
Internet to their own benefit.
The botnet’s on-demand puissance has allowed it to become one of the most potent
threats instigated over the Internet [8,19,38]. A botnet is a collection of compromised com-
puter systems, generally referred to as “zombies” or “bots,” throughout the world which are
under the control of a single entity, termed the “botmaster” or “botherder.” An interesting
aspect of botnets is that they do not generally present novel types of criminal activity.
Botnets are most often used for DDoS, SPAM, phishing, etc., as are other malicious
software. The power of botnets lies in the fact that they are able to easily scale the size of
an attack and to change the type of the attack in a covert way. Thus, a botnet allows an
attacker to gather larger amounts of confidential personal information in a relatively short
period of time while evading detection. Additionally, because a botnet harnesses the power
of thousands of computers through the Internet, the speed and destruction of a botnet’s
denial-of-service attack are exponentially greater than such an attack from other forms of
malware.
The initial concept of the “bot” was actually relatively benevolent: the bots were created
to help maintain, amongst other things, the communication channels employed by servers or
networks using the Internet relay chat (IRC) protocol. These bots connect to the network
as clients, sometimes with elevated privileges, and perform automated tasks specified by
scripting languages, like Perl and Tcl. These bots might be used to distribute files, maintain
logs, prevent malicious users from taking over the channel, etc. These types of bots are, in
fact, still in use for such purposes today. However, it was not long until the concept of the
bot realized a more malevolent end. One could have a channel subscribed to entirely by
bots; this channel could then be used to send the bots new commands, binaries, and allow
for control of the host computer of the bot. This centralized server approach, however, has
presents a weak-point. Identify the server and making it inaccessible from the Internet can
render the botnet impotent. Such action essentially orphans all of the existing bots, and
unless the bot binary has some failsafe for reconnection via a predetermined method, the
4orphaned bots are permanently orphaned.
Researchers and security companies discovered these centralized control structures, and
they soon developed methods to uncover and then mitigate these botmaster-centric bot
networks. Additionally, developers learned that the central server can be monitored for data
on the size of the botnet and the type of activities in which it has engaged. Consequently,
the Internet’s malicious-use paradigm would have to shift again. The key weakness to the
IRC style botnet was its centralized command and control (C&C) structure. Once the
main server was discovered, it could be shutdown or rerouted, thus disabling the botnet
and orphaning the bots. As a result, a decentralized method of botnet C&C would have to
be developed by botnet creators in order to remain hidden and operational. Peer-to-peer
(P2P) style communication is one way a botnet can overcome the inherent weakness of a
centralized C&C botnet.
The advent of P2P botnets was not unexpected, as researchers were actively engaged
in forward-looking research when the first large-scale P2P botnet was identified in January
2007 [27]. Called storm worm, this powerful botnet that utilizes P2P style communication
has been the cause of various incidents of malicious activity. In a P2P botnet, the C&C
is decentralized, as individual bots receive instruction from other bots, not necessarily the
botmaster. Thus, even if a number of bots were to be identified, security professionals may
not have any information as to the actual location of the botmaster. Therefore, tracking the
origin and activity of this botnet is much more difficult. Furthermore, detection techniques
that worked for the centralized C&C infrastructure became obsolete with the advent of
storm worm.
Malicious software had once again evolved, leaving the security and research community
playing catch-up. This brings us to the present-day situation. New detection techniques flag
traffic patterns indicative of bot infections. These detection mechanisms identify network
traffic patterns at strategic locations within a network such as the gateway. These detection
systems, generally referred to as intrusion detection systems (IDS), still have weaknesses,
ways in which they can be beat. So, even though these IDSs are an improvement on
5previous methods, they need to evolve or be replaced, just as botnet designs evolve to evade
detection mechanisms. Analyzing current IDS setups and looking for exploitable weaknesses
is advantageous. Such research allows for the proactive development of defense mechanisms;
this way, measures can be in place to counter new attack types before the are made manifest
in the wild.
This thesis takes a forward-looking approach and presents a specific botnet development
path based on some weakness evident in a currently successful IDS, namely BotHunter. To
the best of this author’s knowledge, BotHunter [15] is the most effective bot detection
system currently available for detecting bots within a local network, including bots utilizing
P2P style communication. As a perimeter-based monitoring system, BotHunter monitors
traffic at the network’s egress points, as do most modern IDSs. The main strength of
perimeter-based systems is the fact that they need only one monitoring point per egress
point (egress point generally refers to the a local or private network’s connection to the
Internet). Typically, a local network has only one such connection. As a result of this setup,
analysis of network traffic is only concerned with perimeter-penetrating communication,
internal-to-external, or external-to-internal traffic and not network contained traffic. This
is of key importance for designing a system that can beat this type of detection technique.
To this end, this project proposes a P2P sub-botnet design such that it evades perimeter-
based detection systems by creating a cooperative group of infected bots within a locally
switched network. This would allow the “sub-botnet,” a group of bots all on the same
switched network or at least all behind the same gateway, to control the monitorable traffic
while avoiding detection. Organizing the sub-botnet such that the amount of communi-
cation that passes through the network gateway is tightly regulated and greatly reduced
accomplishes this end. In short, the proposed system controls the amount and type of traf-
fic that passes through the monitored gateway and shares obtained data among all known
active bots in the local network. This sub-botnet makes use of a token-based framework for
communication coordination among the sub-botnet cohorts. The token essentially allows
the leadership role of the sub-botnet to be passed from one bot to another. The architecture
6only allows for one bot to posses the token at any given time, and said bot is termed the
token bot (TB). The TB is charged with the duties of carrying out external communication,
relaying updates to the sub-botnet, and passing the token to the next bot. Chapter 3 covers
the proposed model in depth.
This model prevents a perimeter-based IDS from identifying communication patterns
known to be indicative of P2P botnet communication between a single internal host and
external systems. This event spreading and information sharing allows the sub-botnet to
circumvent BotHunter’s ability to correlate a sufficient event log for any given internal
host, a necessary step for declaring an internal host as a bot. This event log is referred
to as a “dialog” throughout the remainder of this thesis. This sub-botnet design was
implemented and tested for validity [2] in collaboration with the work presented in this
thesis and was found to successfully circumvent BotHunter’s detection algorithm. This is
possible because the internal source of the communication is not a single bot-host. The
localization of botnet communication enables a portion of the compromised systems to
hide from current perimeter-based detection systems. In order to detect such a botnet
specialization, current IDSs would need a significant increase in network monitoring points,
an increase that currently has not been efficiently implemented.
One might argue the ethical implications of intentionally designing a malware framework
that defeats current detection techniques. For example, it could be argued that proposing
such a framework and making it publicly available aids botnet developers in making better
botnets. This argument might have some merit. Botnet authors are paying attention to
security research, when a vulnerability is found in a botnet implementation, the botnet
administrator moves rapidly to patch it. So there is some give and take in this regard,
botnet authors may learn from security research. The real problem is that this does not
go the other way. The malware development community does not publish their work,
they do not document new vulnerabilities they have found or how they will exploit said
vulnerabilities. This means that the security community is left in the dark until the exploit
starts compromising systems, or until the given vulnerability is published by someone in
7the security community. In order for a vulnerability to get respect and interest from the
security community it is often necessary to create a “proof-of-concept” that validates that
a given vulnerability is exploitable. That is essentially what this thesis is attempting to do,
provide a “proof-of-concept”. The botnet framework developed for this research is purely a
simulation to illustrate that edge-based IDSs have an exploitable vulnerability that needs
to be addressed by the security community before the malware community takes advantage
of it. This area of research is growing in popularity as the security community is coming
to the conclusion that we need to get there first. The conclusion that vulnerabilities need
to be discovered, validated, and published so that the entire community is aware of a given
problem.
As mentioned, this type of sub-botnet specialization is detectable, but requires much
more in-depth monitoring of internal network traffic than is typical. So, in correlation
with the development of a sub-botnet framework, this thesis explores the development of
an efficient switch-level monitoring system that provides the ability to correlate a more
complete analysis of internal only traffic with the border-crossing analysis provided by
current detection systems, such as BotHunter. A Snort instance [34] that monitors traffic
at the network gateway feeds BotHunter’s correlation engine. BotHunter’s Snort instance
makes use of a custom rule set provided and updated by BotHunter. When Snort starts,
the system loads this rule set and uses it to analyze the network traffic. If a given rule
is satisfied, an alert is generated. These alerts feed BotHunter’s correlation engine. This
thesis looks at the makeup of this custom rule set to see if a given rule is payload, flow,
or header driven. In the case of payload or content driven rules, it might be possible to
pass on the rule’s content signature to a switch-level monitor for internal tracking. This
would allow for a limited rule set to be used instead Snort’s full rule set, as well as a
much lighter traffic analysis system, instead of a full Snort instantiation at the switch-level
monitoring points. These switch-level monitoring points could send Snort-type alerts back
to the main BotHunter instance when one of the monitoring points’ rules is triggered. The
monitoring points would periodically prune their rule sets to keep the size and processing
8Table 1.2. Possible Signature-Based Switch-Level Monitoring Failure Scenario
Step Description
1 The current TB connects to an IP address blacklisted by Snort’s rule set.
2 One of Snort’s blacklist rules is triggered during analysis of the packet’s
header.
3 An alert is generated and sent to BotHunter which flags the TB, this ends the
behavior of BotHunter’s current implementation.
4 A secondary system passes the triggered rule to the switch-level monitoring
points so that they can monitor traffic for the blacklisted IP address.
5 The TB distributes the communication to its cohorts; the blacklisted IP is
not present as that IP has now been replaced with the TB’s IP address or
the IP address of another sub-botnet member, depending on who relayed the
communication.
6 The switch-level monitoring points fail to detect the internal transmissions;
the sub-botnet is able to carry on undetected.
load to a minimum. This, along with reporting back to a centralized BotHunter instance,
would push much of the traffic analysis away from the decentralized switch-level monitoring
points. Such action would allow the monitoring points to be relatively cheap and enable
them to maintain unencumbered throughput.
Such a system could be implemented using IPFIX [20]. However, in the case of header
or flow driven rules, this implementation would need further augmentation. Table 1.2 lays
out an example of such a scenario. The rule set analysis covered in Chapter 4 demonstrates
how much of a problem the failure scenario outlined in Table 1.2 would cause for strictly
signature-based switch-level monitoring points. This analysis also looks at which types of
rules are typically used by BotHunter for declaring or detecting certain types of bots.
9CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
As mentioned in Chapter 1, botnets initially relied on a centralized C&C communication
infrastructure utilizing IRC servers as a means to manage remote bot systems [7,12–14,16,
29, 31]. Up until the last couple of years this was a feasible means for controlling and
updating a botnet. Botnets still widely use this architecture and do so rather successfully.
The significant downside of this infrastructure is that a security administrator is able to
monitor these systems by identifying the location of the C&C IRC server and logging in
under the guise of a compromised bot system [3, 6]. Depending on the configuration of
the server, various characteristics of the botnet can be identified including population and
command instructions. Honeypots have made it even easier to detect and mitigate botnets
using IRC servers for C&C. (Honeypots are systems deployed by security administrators
that act as infection targets and allow administrators to detect botnet activity [8, 22, 25,
28, 35, 42]). Various techniques for detection evasion that involve hiding or masquerading
botnet communication activity exist [13, 18, 19, 39, 42]. Even so, it is time for a paradigm
shift. IRC servers are too easy to shutdown and too prone to infiltration, and there is an
ongoing shift to P2P botnets.
More recently, botnets utilizing a P2P [13, 32, 41] style communication infrastructure
have been proposed [14, 39, 42] as well as discovered in the wild [1, 17, 23, 27, 36]. It is
very difficult to ascertain the characteristics of a P2P botnet simply because it is not
possible to monitor a centralized location where all infected bots connect, as such a location
does not exist. Among other reasons, this is why botnets are the most dangerous type of
malware [8, 9, 24, 25, 33]. As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the preeminent P2P botnets
is Storm Worm; it evolves rapidly and is one of the reasons that “BotHunter characterizes
network communication flows as potential stages in an abstract malware infection life cycle,
constructing an evidence trail from which it may conclude that a local asset is interacting
with the Internet in a manner consistent with malware behavior” [27:13]. This allows
BotHunter to keep up with the spambot evolution without having to make any significant
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changes. BotHunter focuses more on an asset’s overall behavior than on the more traditional
“single-packet content inspection.” Section 2.1 discusses exactly how BotHunter goes about
doing this. It should be noted that BotHunter is being used as a representative IDS and the
weaknesses outlined in this thesis are not specific to BotHunter, but actually hold true for
any perimeter-based IDS. This is because the inherent weakness in a perimeter-based system
is due to the location and number of monitoring points. It should also be noted that the
addition of internal monitoring points, as described in Chapter 4, has similar implications
for all perimeter-based IDSs, not just BotHunter.
2.1 BotHunter Overview
BotHunter [15] is one of the most effective tools for detecting a bot within a local
network, including bots utilizing P2P style communication. BotHunter’s main function
is alert correlation: alerts are fed into BotHunter’s parsing engine and used to generate
events, specifically the E∗ events described in Table 2.1. BotHunter then analyzes these
events as they relate to local individual hosts in order to track and maintain per host event
dialogs. These dialogs track the communication between a single local host and its external
counterparts in the form of dialog warnings. Each time a new dialog warning is generated, it
is inserted into a dialog management structure, called the network dialog correlation matrix.
Each row of the network dialog correlation matrix corresponds to one internal host while the
columns correspond to E∗ events. Each time a new dialog warning is added to the matrix,
dialog warnings are potentially pruned and BotHunter’s correlation engine evaluates the
matrix.
2.1.1 Pruning Dialog Warnings
Pruning removes older dialogs from the network dialog correlation matrix. Two types of
pruning can occur, one is dictated by the soft pruning timer, and the other is controlled by
the hard pruning timer. The hard pruning timer can be thought of as an alarm that keeps
triggering over some fixed interval X. During this interval, dialog warnings are allowed to
accumulate; at the end of this interval, BotHunter’s correlation engine evaluates the dialog
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in order to determine if the internal host meets the criteria for being declared a bot. At this
point, old events are pruned. The soft pruning timer typically configures tighter pruning
intervals, which might be necessary for dialog warnings with higher occurrence rates. For
example, the soft pruning interval expires E1 events since they occur frequently and can
often end up being benign. If a dialog warning is being expired exclusively due to the soft
pruning timer, it is discarded without any evaluation.
2.1.2 Correlation Engine
BotHunter’s correlation engine uses a weighted scoring system to determine if the host
should be declared a bot, as described in [15]. The dialog warnings of importance consist
primarily of E1− E5 events, although there are other event types. The correlation engine
gives each event type a different weight coefficient which is in turn applied to an expectation
table so that a bot declaration threshold can be determined. This threshold is translated into
a minimum bot declaration criteria, as described in Table 2.3. When BotHunter evaluates
its network dialog correlation matrix, it determines if a host’s dialog warnings satisfy either
of the two scenarios in Table 2.3; if one of said scenarios is satisfied, BotHunter declares the
host a bot, at which point mitigation actions may be taken against the bot. See Figure 2.1
for examples.
2.1.2.1 BotHunter’s Sensors
One of the reasons that BotHunter is such an effective bot detection system is that it is
fed by multiple IDSs or sensors, namely, SLADE, SCADE, and Snort, as Table 2.2 outlines.
Each IDS or sensor plays a role in motoring and detecting possible bot activity.
Snort does a majority of the work as it is the primary alert generator for E3 and
E4 events and a secondary alert generator for E2 events. It should also be noted that
SCADE is actually a preprocessor plug-in to Snort. The Snort instance used by BotHunter
is a standard Snort install, except that it makes use of a custom ruleset and its alerts are
piped into BotHunter for processing. Most of the rule customization comes from adding
the correct E∗ designations to the rule’s alert message output.
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Table 2.1. Primary BotHunter Event Types
Event Type Description
E1 Inbound Malware Focused Scans
E2 In and Outbound Exploits
• Client-side infection attempts (Web)
• RPC exploits
• Netbios attacks
• OP/Shell code attack via overflow
• Special Port Exploits
• High Application Port Exploits
• Browser Specific Attacks (Inbound only)
• Bad email from non-SMTP (Outbound only)
• Moderate malware-focused scan (Outbound only)
• Prolific non-malware-focused scan (Outbound only)
E3 Inbound Forced Download / Illegal Software Install (Binary Acquisition)
• Malware/Trojan-initiated download request
• Classic network stream binary
• Malware FTP comms
• Web-based spyware infection download / Install
E4 In and Outbound C&C Communication
• Web-based spyware phone home / periodic check-in
• Web-based malware install success reports
• Inbound spyware command detection (flow established)
• Web-based ADWARE phone home
• BotNet C&C login/dialog / command recognition
• Trojan horse periodic checkin (primarily via web ports)
• Application port checkin/install success reports
• DNS-based call-backs
• SMTP call-backs (from non-SMTP hosts)
• IRC botnet C&C
E5 Outbound Infection Scanning
• Spambot Mx record search via DNS
• DNS malware associated query
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SLADE is the primary detector of exploit attempts, which are E2 events. A lot of
exploit attempts fail, so E2 event generation is not sufficient for bot declaration. However,
as shown in Table 2.3, an E2 event along with any E3, E4, or E5 event is sufficient to
declare a bot infection. SCADE detects E1 events, these are inbound scans, which do not
play a major role in bot declaration. It is expected that inbound scanning will occur often
with or without bot infection, and so this event is not considered heavily when deciding if
a host has been infected. SCADE also detects E5 events; these are triggered by outbound
scans which would likely occur after bot infection. As shown in Table 2.3, E5 events are an
integral part of host infection declaration.
2.2 Evading Detection
As mentioned in Section 2.1, Bothunter centers on the ability to detect the five distinct
events [5] listed in Table 2.1. In order to declare the existence of a bot infection, one of
the two conditions described in Table 2.3 must be met. A second consideration is that
these events must, at a minimum, occur within the hard pruning interval. Spacing bot
activities in excess of the hard pruning interval can defeat BotHunter’s correlation engine.
This action spacing results in a botnet with a slower attack rate [37]. Overall, the botnet
will also be far less responsive. Another problem with this detection evasion technique is
that merely modifying BotHunter’s configuration file can change the pruning thresholds
(both soft and hard). BotHunter’s pruning thresholds come preset to four minutes, and
the evasion evaluation tested in [37] assumes this will not change. A system administrator
might periodically vary the threshold in an attempt to circumvent this bot action spacing
detection evasion technique. The administrator might also set the hard pruning threshold
to an arbitrary long interval; however, this would increase the resource load of a BotHunter
instance. With a large network, such action could become problematic. This evasion
technique would be rather trivial to implement, but it could be defeated without any real
modification to BotHunter’s bot detection scheme.
BotHunter relies on the ability to correctly identify an infection dialog, specifically the
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Table 2.2. BotHunter Sensors
IDS Description
SCADE Statistical sCan Anomaly Detection Engine
• Snort preprocessor plug-in
• Similar in convention to existing detection methods [15, 21, 30], but it focuses more
on known malware ports
• Two modules:
1. Inbound scan detection (E1 event) - different weights depending on vulnerabil-
ities of services on port scanned
– High severity (HS) - 26 TCP and 4 UDP ports
∗ 80/HTTP, 135,1025/DCOM, 445/NetBIOS, 5000/UPNP, 3127/My-
Doom
– Low severity (LS) - all other ports
2. Outbound scan detection (E5 event) - uses a voting scheme (AND, OR or
MAJORITY) [15] of 3 parallel anomaly detection schemes
(a) Outbound scan rate
(b) Outbound connection failure rate
(c) Normalized entropy of scan target distribution
SLADE Statistical payLoad Anomaly Detection Engine
• Primary source for E2 events
• Similar to PAYL [15,40], it creates a model for normal port traffic based on payload
analysis
– Similarities
∗ Payload is considered anomalous if simplified Mahalanobis distance ex-
ceeds predetermined threshold
∗ Effective in detecting worm exploits
– Differences
∗ PAYL can be evaded using polymorphic blending attack (BPA) [11, 15],
while SLADE is not prone to defeat by polymorphic blending attacks
∗ PAYL is 1-gram versus SLADE uses a lossy algorithm to achieve near n-
gram accuracy via a hash function to map from an 256n feature space to
an ideal v feature space [15]
Snort Open source signature, protocol, and anomaly based based network intrusion prevention
and detection system (IDS/IPS) [34]
• Secondary source for E2 events
• Primary source for E3 and E4 events
• Rulesets: (taken from Bleeding-Edge [4,15] and SourceFire’s registered free rulesets1)
– E2 - 1046 rules
– E3 - 71 rules
– E4 - 246 rules
– E5 - 20 rules
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Table 2.3. BotHunter Bot Declaration Scenarios
Scenario Description
1 1. Evidence of local host infection (E2)
2. Evidence of outward bot coordination or attack propagation (E3−E5)
2 At least two distinct signs of outward bot coordination or attack propagation
(E3− E5)
dialogs outlined in Table 2.3, in order to detect a bot within a managed network. Figure
2.1 provides examples of the dialogs outlined in Table 2.3. As is the case with traditional
IDS techniques, the network traffic generated must pass through the monitor in order to be
identified effectively; otherwise, it is not “seen” by the IDS in question. Typically, this is a
perimeter-based system, and this holds true for BotHunter. If the traffic generated never
passes through BotHunter’s perimeter-based sensors, said traffic cannot be considered while
tracking an infection dialog. Essentially, hiding internal-only traffic is possible. To this end,
this thesis proposes a communication method that negates the effective detection techniques
of traffic monitoring systems by minimizing the amount of traffic and by controlling the type
of traffic that passes through a network monitoring node, while at the same time enabling
infected systems to receive all appropriate commands and instructions from the botmaster
without a noticeable increase in latency.
In order for specialized bot behavior to be viable, a bot must be able to actively partici-
pate in the global botnet while eliminating events that may lead to its detection. In the case
of BotHunter, Table 2.3 lists the scenarios that the bot must avoid. As such, this project
proposed the event alternatives shown in Table 2.4. These A∗ events can achieve results
similar to their E∗ counterparts while avoiding traffic that passes through an IDS monitor-
ing point. The initial bot infection still must occur through a normal infection vector, but
once the infection is instantiated on a local host, it can spread internally without detection.
A key factor in IDS techniques is that event correlation is tied to a single interior host. As
Chapter 3 shows, infected systems can coordinate with each other to share the burden of




























Figure 2.1. Regular bot infection scenario. BotHunter correctly flags infected hosts when
the criteria outlined in the scenarios in Table 2.3 are satisfied.
Table 2.4. Specialized BotHunter Event Types
Event Types Description
A2 Internal Exploits
A3 Internal Binary Acquisition
A4 Internal C&C Communication
A5 Internal Infection Scanning
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Table 2.5. Local Network Assumptions
Assumption Description
1 Communication within a switched network does not penetrate the router,
other than defined protocols such as DHCP proxy.
2 IDS-type monitors do not process information that does not move from
the internal to external interface, or vice-versa, of the router.
3 Switches utilized as network monitoring points do not have (or are not
used for) IDS capabilities (typically used for monitoring bandwidth).
system and all external communication events. One of the internal bots must maintain an
external connection, but this job can be shared, and the events performed rotated. Events
A3 and A4 would then share new commands and binaries with the local botnet. This allows
the localized botnet to remain responsive while it hides from IDSs like BotHunter. Table
2.5 lists important assumptions this thesis makes made about the network environment.
Note that these assumptions may not be true of all networks, but are common in typical
enterprise networks. The proposed communication model is not able to evade detection
completely; however, as will be discussed later, negating assumptions two and three is the




A sub-botnet utilizes the special characteristics afforded by having a localized group of
hosts sharing the same gateway to the Internet. The internal bots must effectively share
resources so that no one bot is ever left in a vulnerable state. This chapter discusses the
framework for such a sub-botnet.
3.1 Sub-Botnet Creation Background
After a system is compromised by an external source, the newly compromised system
must determine if other systems within the switched network are already part of the botnet.
If no other systems are detected, the newly infected system attempts to identify and infect
other systems within the switched network. Needless to say, this is done in a stealthy
manner in order to minimize the chance of being detected by network security devices. This
internal only method of infection is advantageous because it effectively hides the spread of
the botnet on the local network. Infection vectors originating external to the network have
a greater potential for being identified as the infection communication has to pass through a
potentially monitored perimeter access point. It is not feasible, however, to infect all systems
in this manner; some infections are user driven and might require the user’s interaction to
unknowingly carry out an activity that requires navigating to an external host. Therefore,
external infections still play an important role in overall botnet propagation.
If other systems on the network have already been infected, the newly infected system
is identified and incorporated into the sub-botnet. A stealthy broadcast message of an
existing protocol such as DHCP accomplishes this. The sub-botnet continues to monitor
for newly infected systems resulting from an infection vector that originated from an external
source. As the sub-botnet grows in size, it is better able to evade detection by a perimeter-
based monitoring system, as it can more effectively distribute external communication tasks
amongst the members of the sub-botnet.
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3.1.1 Initial Infection
A system can become infected by a malicious bot program in a number of ways, each
ending with the same result: a compromised host that is part of a botnet. Initially, at least
one system in the network must become infected and obtain the botnet binary in some
fashion. Assume that this initial infection avoids detection by some means such as that
proposed in [15]. Once the initial host has been compromised and the initial bot is active,
the organization of the sub-botnet can begin.
One key to preventing a network monitor from identifying a bot system is to eliminate or
minimize E2 events. Thus, the first activity of the initial bot is to seek to compromise other
systems in the local network before a successful inbound malware focused scan, classified as
an E1 event, can occur. However, since an E1 event is not a component of either of the bot
declaration scenarios detailed in Table 2.3, it is not critical that all E1 events be avoided in
and of themselves. The issue lies with the fact that E1 events often predicate E2 events.
That being said, the bot takes two steps to prevent detection.
The first step involves checking its host system for vulnerabilities like exploitable ser-
vices. If the bot finds a vulnerability it can exploit, it makes the assumption that other
systems in the local network have the same vulnerability. Thus, port scanning for vulnera-
bilities is unnecessary, and the initial bot can target other systems.
This is a logical assumption because, in many cases, systems located within the same
switched network generally have similar configurations. University computer labs and indi-
vidual corporate departments like customer service, accounting, and so forth illustrate the
validity of this assumption. These types of environments potentially provide a great deal of
power for the overall botnet, so the botmaster has great incentive to protect the availability
of this resource.
The second step the initial bot takes is to monitor network traffic to identify the IP
and MAC addresses of systems within the locally switched network. MAC may be used for
custom communication within the sub-botnet, because doing so avoids unnecessary ARP
requests and reduces overhead incurred by relying on the OS to resolve the IP address.
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DHCP requests, ARP messages, and other broadcast traffic enable the initial bot to identify
many of these local systems. This step is important as the initial bot desires to hide its
presence as much as possible. Randomly selecting targets for exploitation may result in
quick identification of the infected system. Additionally, if the exploit attempts cross IDS-
type monitored devices, such as a router, administrators may detect the attack.
After determining potentially valid exploits and targets, the initial bot creates a sub-
botnet by attempting to compromise other systems. This is an A2 event. An internal host
is able to infect another internal host without either being flagged for E∗ events. See Figure
3.1. When another local host is compromised, the bot binary can include system patches
such that E1 events will be unsuccessful, and consequently prevents attempts at future E2
events.
3.1.2 New E2 Discovery
While infecting every system in the local switched network with an A2 event, thereby
preventing all future E2 events would be ideal, it is not realistic. In fact, there are E2-type
infections that are not possible through an A2 event. Emails with malicious attachments
or that direct users to websites containing malware can also infect systems. These two
infection methods require human interaction and can be an effective means of infecting
otherwise secure systems.
When this type of E2 infection occurs, the newly infected system can better protect
itself from being detected if it avoids unnecessary E3 − E5 events. In order to do so, the
newly infected system must discover whether or not another system within the local network
is already part of the botnet. If such a bot exists, the newly infected system obtains the
needed bot binary and other communication from a bot within the local network, as shown
in Figure 3.1. This way, the newly infected host relies on local bots to provide the necessary
information.
Utilizing a broadcast message, the newly infected system begins the discovery phase in















































Figure 3.1. Sub-botnet infection scenario. BotHunter does not flag sub-botnet bots as
neither of the scenarios outlined in Table 2.3 occur. It should be noted that T represents
the TB.
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to infect, the compromised host utilizes already existent network messages to “announce”
the presence of a potential new bot. Section 3.1.2.1 discusses in more depth an implemen-
tation that utilizes a pre-determined pattern of DHCP request messages [10]. However,
the announcement broadcast can be accomplished using other broadcast messages, such as
address resolution protocol (ARP), as well.
Upon observing this specialized broadcast sequence, the reigning bot, referred to as the
token bot (TB) and discussed in detail in Section 3.2, identifies the MAC address of the
source machine and directs a message to the newly infected system. The welcome message
is directed to a pre-determined port on the newly infected machine, or it is determined
dynamically by utilizing the unused portion of the DHCP request. At this point, the TB
delivers the bot binary to the newly infected host, allowing it become an active part of the
sub-botnet.
3.1.2.1 Custom Bot Announcement
The newly infected system takes advantage of an error prevention mechanism in the
DHCP protocol. When a system issues a DHCP request, it can repeat the request approxi-
mately four seconds later [10], if a response is not received. This period between command
retries is dependent on the internetwork speed and the granularity of the system’s internal
clock. These two factors are combined, and a randomly distributed duration is computed.
This duration determines the time before the first retry. For each new retry, the waiting
period is doubled up to a maximum of 64 seconds. This part of the protocol is already rela-
tively rare. Additionally, the sub-botnet’s “announcement” protocol can make use of slight
variations to the DHCP request protocol in order to make its announcement broadcast even
more distinct. For example, the sub-botnet could use a predetermined set of timeouts: 8
seconds, 32 seconds, and 64 seconds. This involves four DHCP requests and has a signature
that allows the newly infected host to differentiate its announcement broadcast from an
ordinary host’s DHCP request retry sequence. Even with this specific sequence, the an-




As shown in Table 2.3, there are certain event dialogs that are detected as a bot infection
by BotHunter. Figure 2.1 shows two such examples, one in which a bot commits E2 and E4
events and the other in which a bot commits E3 and E4 events. Recall that BotHunter’s
original events are E∗ and that the sub-botnet’s equivalent events are A∗. Tables 2.1
and 2.4 cover the specifics of these events, respectively. In order to avoid detection, the
events that each bot may perform must be controlled. A sub-botnet can avoid detection
by strategically utilizing A∗ events in order to minimize the number of E∗ events required
to maintain effective communication with the overall botnet. Additionally, the E∗ events
must be executed in a way that is not only minimal on a sub-botnet basis, but is strategic
on a bot-basis, thereby controlling the external exposure of any single bot. To illustrate
this point, let δ be a safe or undetectable state and η be a detectable state. Now let
α ≡ (A2 ∨A3 ∨A4)
β ≡ (E3 ∧ E4)
and
(E2 ∧ (E3 ∨ E4)) ≡ γ.
It follows that
α ∧ ¬β ∧ ¬γ ≡ α ∧ ¬(β ∨ γ) ≡ δ
and that
β ∨ γ ≡ η.
Therefore, it is necessary to control a bot’s actions such that only δ occurs within the thresh-
old that the IDS allows for events to aggregate over before pruning. In BotHunter’s case, the
concern is with the hard pruning threshold. This defaults to four minutes but can be easily
modified. This pruning threshold is present because BotHunter, or any IDS, must eventually
prune old events from each internal host’s infection dialog; Section 2.1 covers BotHunter’s
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soft and hard pruning algorithms. Without pruning, a system could become bloated with
out-of-date log information needing to be stored and repeatedly analyzed. Therefore, a
good balance between maintaining necessary information for bot declaration and freeing up
resources, disk space, CPU cycles, etc., must be achieved. Since both BotHunter’s hard and
soft pruning thresholds may be changed easily by the IDS administrator, it is not sufficient
for a bot to rely on event spacing as a means for defeating BotHunter’s detection system.
Also, planning event execution in accordance with perceived pruning thresholds would also
result in a sub-botnet with sluggish responsiveness to new commands. As illustrated in
Figure 3.2, this time out (TO) factor is accounted for but is not relied upon for thwarting
BotHunter’s detection scheme. So, how can BotHunter be beat without relying on event
timing? The answer is event sharing: when a bot commits an E∗ event, it shares the results
via an A∗ event. Figure 3.1 illustrates this, and the remainder of this chapter discusses the
concept in greater detail.
Once again, the goal is to limit the botnet’s monitorable exposure to a single bot at any
given time; changing which bot is exposed potentially avoids detection by a perimeter-style
IDS. Figure 3.2 illustrates this idea. Note that a missing transition means that a transition
does not apply or that the transition does not result in a state change. As an example,
consider that a bot executes an E2 event followed by an A3 event. If the next event is
an E4 event, the monitoring system will detect the bot. The bot must still obtain C&C
communication to be an effective botnet participant. So in order to avoid detection, it must
participate in the necessary communication through an A4 event. However, if an E4 event
occurs before a TO period, an estimate of the pruning period of the monitor, the bot will
still be detected.
A round-robin type duty-passing algorithm has the potential to control E∗ events while
maintain external communication. At the same time, it protects bots from executing com-
munication dialogs that would expose the bot to detection by an IDS monitor. The token
acts as an authority key for the bot (the TB) that possesses it. This bot performs internal
























Figure 3.2. Individual bot state graph. S1 is an uninfected state, S4 is the ideal state, S8
is a detectable state, and all other states are considered semi-safe or undetected.
all bots in the sub-botnet. In the pursuit of detection avoidance, the sub-botnet manage-
ment scheme must assure that each bot only performs one external (E2−E4) event within
a given timespan. Further, it is desirable that each bot perform the same E3 or E4 event
each time it initiates said event and that only one bot be engaged in such an event at any
given time.
To this end, the sub-botnet uses the TB to perform the external actions and an internal
report peer list to share traceable events amongst all the bots in the subnet. In the pursuit
of detection avoidance, the sub-bot management scheme must assure that each bot only
performs one type of external (E2 − E4) event within a given timespan. Further, it is
desirable that each bot perform the same E3 or E4 event each time it initiates said event
so that event timing is not an issue. It is also desirable that only one bot is engaged in
such an E∗ at any given time so that the management scheme design can remain relatively
simple.
In order to maintain the restrictions on E∗ events, the sub-botnet institutes a token
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Table 3.1. Token and Communication Sharing Process
Step Abbreviation Description
1 TAQ Token Acquisition
2 TAC Perform Token Action, known as an E3 or E4 event
3 TRRB Issue Token Report Request Broadcast and compile Token
4 TARP Start Token Action Result Propagation, qualifying as an A3
or A4 event
5 TP Token Pass
passing scheme, wherein only the TB may initiate internal to external bot communication.
Assuming that there are two or more bots present in the sub-botnet, the following token
passing and resource sharing framework is applicable. Table 3.1 outlines the steps in the
token handling process, and Figure 3.3 shows in more detail the TB’s actions in this process.
If there are any issues that prevent the TB from performing all these actions, a token election
(TE) takes place to recover the token. The TB also holds the responsibility of identifying
new bots infected via E2 events and sending the new bot the current binary. Section 3.1.2
discusses this process in detail. As far as A2 events are concerned, the bot that initiated
the A2 event is charged with handling the A3 event for the newly infected bot.
3.2.1 Token Data
The token is a data structure that contains all required information to enable the TB to
make intelligent decisions about executing internal to external communication, forwarding
information to the sub-botnet, and passing the token to other bots. The token’s data
structure includes the components shown in Table 3.2. In general the token is compiled
during the TRRB stage.
The report list in Table 3.2 is a local peer list that only contains bots in the same
switched subnet. Table 3.3 covers the components in each entry of the report list. The
report list is the primary tool for token passing, and token election should token passing
fail. The complete report list is not distributed over multiple bots. Such action is not
beneficial for sub-botnet management and does not achieve the same botnet concealment
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Figure 3.3. Token bot activities. Overview of TB activities.
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Table 3.2. Token Contents
Item Description
Report list An internal only peer list
Action History The last two internal to external actions performed (E3 or
E4 events)
Timestamp Indicative of when token was compiled
Bot Binary Version Denotes the current binary version
Table 3.3. Report Entry Contents
Item Description
Address The physical or MAC address of the host
Action The last TAC the bot performed
Timestamp Indicative of when last TAC was performed or of original
infection if no TAC has been performed
Bot Binary version Denotes bot’s current binary version
Dormancy Counter Used to track unresponsive bots, indicates how many subse-
quent times the bot has been unresponsive
characteristics as it does in the Internet where access to the other bots is restricted. The
TAC for the given bot is implied by the information in the report list.
3.2.2 External Communication
The TAQ is fairly straightforward, as the bot will generally have the token passed to
it through some variation of the token pass process. This token pass may have occurred
explicitly due to TB failure or implicitly as part of a normal token passing procedure. At this
point, the TB announces that it has acquired the token. Following a TAQ, the new TB is
listed in the report list with the associated token bot action (TAC) to be performed. This is
normally the same action it performed previously, but it may be a different action if sufficient
time has passed since the previous action was executed and bot action restructuring has
occurred, as discussed in Section 3.2.4.1. In any event, the action to be performed should
not be one of the two previous actions performed by former TBs as dictated by the action
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Table 3.4. Possible Token Bot Actions (TAC)
Event Type Token Action
E3 Binary Update Check and subsequent Download if applicable
E4 Peerlist Update Request
E4 Command Update Request
history. Figure 3.3 illustrates TB’s activities, and Sections 3.2.2 to 3.2.4.2 discuss them in
greater detail.
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3 show the three possible TACs that a TB can execute. The
two E4 events are considered separate types of communication in the interest of token
management. Prior to executing a TAC, the TB issues a TAQ acknowledgment broadcast
that contains the action to be performed. This message acts as a heartbeat indicator for the
bots and forces each bot to reset its timeout period. If the timeout period for a bot expires
prior to receiving the next TARP message, that bot will issue a TE request to recover the
token. Section 3.2.5 presents this TE process. The system always updates the peerlist, but
it does not always update the other two actions. Regardless, the no update status is still
propagated to the subnet in the interest of uniform sub-botnet management.
3.2.2.1 Command and Binary Updates
The command update request and binary update check for a sub-botnet work the same
for the TB as they do for an external peer that is not part of any sub-botnet. Thus, external
bots do not need to distinguish between sub-botnet requests and non-sub-botnet requests.
The only modification in the process is that a TB forwards any updates on to the other
members of the sub-botnet via TARP.
3.2.2.2 Peerlist Update
An external peer on the TB’s peerlist updates the peerlist by proxy. The TB sends a
peerlist update request to an external peer and propagates through the list until it receives
an acknowledgment. If no external peer responds, the TB falls back on the default peer
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discovery method as denoted by the P2P protocol used by the botnet. Assuming the TB
finds a responsive peer, the external peer generates an updated peerlist and relays it to the
TB. The TB then forwards this new list to the sub-botnet, and each individual bot updates
its list accordingly.
3.2.3 Sub-Botnet Message Propagation
After a successful TAC, the TB must propagate the results to members of the sub-
botnet. The token report request broadcast (TRRB) and TARP phases of the process
handle this process, as is illustrated in Figure 3.1. As part of these phases, the TB sends
the entire data content of the token and the result of the TAC to each bot, as further
illustrated in Figure 3.5.
3.2.3.1 Token Report Request Broadcast
Upon completion of the TAC, the TB issues a TRRB to which any viable local bot
replies, as shown in Figure 3.4. Each bot replies with its last performed action, a timestamp
for when that action was performed, and its bot binary version.
The TB compiles the report list, updates the action history with the action it just
completed, and associates a timestamp with the report list. The timestamp is then used
during TE. The bots have some wait threshold that is normally distributed. This threshold
hovers around an optimal timeout in which bots expect to see the TARP message that is in
proportion to the bots’ estimate of the botnet size and the type of action being propagated.
They base their estimate of the botnet size on the size of the last report list received. If the
wait threshold is exceeded, the bots attempt to contact the TB. If the TB responds, they
continue to wait; otherwise, a TE takes place. In order for this to happen, the TB would
have to go offline before sending out an updated report list or an updated action history.








Figure 3.4. Token report request broadcast. Token bot issuing TRRB, and the subsequent
responses from the currently active bots in its subnet.
3.2.3.2 Token Action Result Propagation
Assuming a successful TRRB, the TB now has an updated report list that includes all
currently active bots in its subnet. The TB uses the report list as the means for passing
the updated information to the sub-botnet. The TB first places itself at the bottom of the
report list, then attempts to forward the token to the first bot in the list. If this bot is
unresponsive, the TB continues on to the next bot in the list. Once the token has been
successfully transmitted, the receiving bot forwards the token to the next bot on the list.
This process continues until all bots have received the token and the TB that initiated the
process receives the token back.
If a bot is unresponsive to the TARP attempt, its dormancy counter is incremented,
and the next bot in the list is contacted. During future TARP processes, a bot with a non-
zero dormancy counter is selected for a connection request in a probabilistic manner based
on the value of the counter. If it is still unresponsive, the system increments the counter. If







Figure 3.5. Token action result propagation. TB passing a “copy” of the token as part of
the TARP process.
is assumed to be permanently unreachable and the system removes the dormant bot from
the report list. If, at some point, the bot is responsive, the dormancy counter is reset to
zero.
When a bot has the token, it checks its binary version with the current version listed
in the token. If an update is in order, the bot makes a request to the TB from which it
receives the next TAQ acknowledgment. This places the burden of initiating updating on
the individual bot rather than on the TB. Additionally, each bot may update any outdated
information in the report list.
When a bot receives the token, in essence it is the TB until it forwards the token on
to the next bot. It does not take on the communication duties of the TB, however, unless
it receives the token as a result of a token pass (TP) or TE process. When the TB that
originated the TARP process receives the token again, it proceeds to the TP phase. If
the original TB is not available for some reason, the bot possessing the token takes on the
responsibility of executing the TP. The bot knows it must assume this responsibility if it
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cannot successfully communicate with any bots in the remainder of the report list. This
assumption of responsibility allows command propagation and token passing to continue,
even if the TB becomes unresponsive mid-process.
3.2.4 Changing the Token Bot
After receiving the token back, the TB must decide to which bot it will pass the token.
This situation might also arise if the TB proves unresponsive in the final stage of the TARP
process, as mentioned in Section 3.2.3.2. In such a case, the bot choosing the next TB is
not the former TB but is the last bot to get the token data as part of the TARP process.
3.2.4.1 Choosing the Token Bot
Choosing the token bot is a two-fold process: identifying the next TAC to be performed
and selecting an appropriate bot to carry out the action. The system can easily identify
the next TAC to be performed, because it is the TAC missing from the current action
history. The TB then scans the report list, identifying the bot with the oldest timestamp
associated with the TAC that needs to be performed. It also looks at all the bots that have
not executed a TAC and that have an initial infection timestamp greater than a pre-defined
minimum threshold, i.e., some estimation of the IDS pruning threshold. If one of the latter
categories is available, it may be used first. It is ideal that the sub-botnet maintains a
balance of bots designated for each type of TAC. The re-balancing should generally only
be attempted when a new bot has its TAC designation determined. The reasoning behind
this relates to BotHunter’s pruning threshold, which is likely an unknown factor for the
sub-botnet. If a bot that has previously performed one type of TAC is assigned a different
TAC and both TACs that are performed by said bot occur within BotHunter’s hard pruning
threshold, then the bot host’s dialog will likely satisfy the requirement for bot declaration,
as outlined in Table 2.3. Another issue may arise in which no bots satisfy the requirements
for TB selection. In this case, the bot with the least recently performed TAC might have
its bot designation reassigned in order for the sub-botnet to maintain normal operation.
However, this is not necessarily an ideal scenario as the bot might suffer the same problem
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just mentioned and be declared a bot by BotHunter. In this case, another option might be
a timeout wherein the sub-botnet waits to see if a new bot comes on-line or if a previously
offline bot resurfaces that satisfies the TB selection requirements. Otherwise, the sub-botnet
remains in its wait state for some predetermined timeout in hopes of exceeding BotHunter’s
hard pruning threshold. Each option has trade-offs: if the goal of the sub-botnet is to
remain stealthy, then the second option might work better; otherwise, the first option
allows the sub-botnet to maintain responsiveness even though it might be more vulnerable
to detection.
3.2.4.2 Passing the Token
The TB initiates the process by sending a TP offer to the target bot. If the target
bot identifies itself as having an old bot binary during the TARP phase, it replies with a
message stating such and receives the updated binary from the TB. Once the binary has
been updated or if the binary was already up-to-date, the target bot issues a TP acceptance
to the TB. The outgoing TB responds with a final acknowledgment, including the current
token data, and the incoming TB takes over all TB responsibilities.
The new TB receives the current version of the token even though it just received a
copy during the TARP process. During the TARP process, it is possible for a bot to update
information in the report list between the time when the new TB forwarded the token and
the old TB received it; thus, the new TB must obtain the new version to prevent updated
information from being lost.
3.2.5 Token Election
The TE request is a catch-all method for handling any TB failure. In the event that
the TB becomes unavailable whatever the reason, the system executes a TE to reestablish
the management authority within the sub-botnet. The TE request can be initiated by any
bot after the bot’s timeout period has expired (the timeout period is reset each time a bot
receives communication from the TB). As the TE request is initiated by an independent










Figure 3.6. Token election. In the token request collision, bots a and b initiate a TE request
within the same timespan. In the Successful TE, bot a finally passes the token to bot c, at
which point bot c makes a TAQ broadcast.
In the case of simultaneous TE requests, special handling must be considered. This
situation can arise if two or more bots issue a request at the same time or if there is a
broadcast propagation delay that allows for another bot to issue the same request before
receiving the other bot’s broadcast. If a bot that issues a TE request receives a TE request
from another bot, it cancels its TE as will the other bot that issued a request. These bots
then generate a random backoff that must elapse before they make another TE request.
This insures that only one TE request succeeds at any given time. The bots not trying to
issue a TE request acknowledge all requests. When a bot receives this request, it sends its
report list with the report list’s timestamp to the requesting bot. If there is a collision, the
requesting bot still accepts responses but does not actually perform the election, as shown
in Figure 3.6.
Upon receiving the report list, the bot that made the request looks for the report list
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with the most recent timestamp and uses that to replace its own report list. Anytime a
bot that has not made a TE request receives said request, it resets its waiting period. This
helps to keep the number of bots trying to initiate a TE to a minimum.
The bot that issues the TE request waits for responses for a set time period optimized for
the size of the sub-botnet. If the wait period expires without the bot in question receiving
another bot’s TE request, the bot issues a broadcast that TE was successful. When the
other bots receive this message, they know to initiate another wait. They set a wait limit
randomly distributed at some maximum wait threshold. If this wait period is exceeded, the
bots attempt to contact the bot that issued the broadcast. If this bot responds, the wait
continues; otherwise, another TE is initiated in the same manner.
The bot that issues the TE success broadcast uses the action history and the most up-
to-date report list that it received to pick a new TB. The method for choosing a new TB is
essentially the same as the method used for passing the token. Once the bot finds a suitable
responsive bot, it passes the token to that bot, as shown in Figure 3.6. At this point, the
new bot makes the TAQ broadcast, and the sub-botnet may resume normal activity.
3.3 Sub-Botnet vs. Botnet
In comparing Figures 2.1 and 3.1, it can easily be seen that the sub-botnet can maintain
the same level of connectivity as the regular botnet without being detected by a perimeter-
type IDS like BotHunter. As mentioned, this ability to hide can be attributed to internal
communication and controlled external communication. This circumvention of current IDS
detection techniques lies in the fact that they rely exclusively on perimeter-style traffic mon-
itoring. This leads to the next chapter which introduces the augmentation of current IDSs
to include internal monitoring points, thus allowing for internal traffic monitoring. This





The system discussed in Chapter 3 has been shown to be able to effectively evade
detection from traditional IDSs and dialog-based botnet detection systems [2], specifically
BotHunter.1 However, it is not immune to detection; the key reason that the proposed
sub-botnet was able to avoid detection is that in the simulations that were run, the local
network adhered to the assumptions outlined in Table 2.5.
BotHunter’s sensors were setup at the perimeter of the network; in this instance, only
traffic that passed through the networks gateway could be analyzed and monitored for traffic
indicative of bot infections. Since A∗ events are internal only, BotHunter’s sensors did not
detect them. On the other hand, BotHunter’s sensors did detect and correctly correlate the
simulated E∗ events. However, BotHunter failed to detect any bot infections, because the
A∗ events gave the sub-botnet bots the ability to avoid carrying out E∗ events that would
have satisfied BotHunter’s criteria for detection, as outlined in Table 2.3.
It should follow that augmenting an IDS, like BotHunter, in a way that negates the
assumptions in Table 2.5 would allow the resultant system to effectively detect the sub-
botnet. This chapter presents techniques for augmenting BotHunter’s sensor holdings in
order to allow for internal network traffic monitoring and analysis. Section 4.2 explores the
strengths and weaknesses of such an augmentation.
4.1 Proposed Defense System
If the assumptions from Table 2.5 are negated, detection of a sub-botnet becomes more
probable. The first assumption is not easily changeable: the sub-botnet in question uses
custom ARP management and MAC addressing to avoid any unnecessary contact with
the router. This helps to insure that only external traffic penetrates or permeates to the
router, in this case the monitoring point. Since the first assumption generally holds true,
it becomes necessary to look at the second and third assumptions for a means to detect
1A more in-depth description of the simulations run and the resultant findings is available in [2].
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sub-botnet infections. These assumptions relate to monitoring traffic at the switch level.
Basically, a system allowing an IDS to monitor traffic at the switch level, would negate the
second and third assumptions in Table 2.5. Solving the problem of monitoring traffic at
the switch-level is no easy fix. The shear amount of resources required for a brute force
solution is prohibitive. Switches are generally resource limited, so putting a full IDS at each
switch is not readily plausible. That aside, the cost of installing that many IDSs and then
monitoring them would be staggering; assuming the system could be setup, the man-power
required to handle all the monitoring data would be exorbitant.
4.1.1 Minimum Detection Requirements
At a minimum, the modified IDS needs to add additional switch-level monitoring points
and bring some of the bot traffic detection capability that is available at the gateway
monitoring point to these newly added switch-level or internal monitoring points. This
project employs Snort signatures and adds pseudo-monitoring points to each switch in the
test network.
4.1.1.1 Sub-botnet Signatures
Brief examples of signatures for the sub-botnet are briefly are below. Some of these
signatures maybe difficult to fully utilize due to the complexity of the Snort ruleset; Section
4.2.1 further discusses these difficulties.
1. A2 Events: A2 infection events target specific hosts and thus, do not expose the
initial bot the way port scanning activities can. This activity is identical to an E2
event except that it originates internally to the network. In a simple case, the signature
has only changed in the source of the data; in a more complex case, the source of the
data may actually be the signature, so these events are not necessarily detectable
without specialized handling.
2. A3 Events: A3 egg-download or binary acquisition events can be problematic to
detect. At a minimum, the system would have access to content-based signatures,
the actual signature of the binary. In some cases, as with the A2 situation other flow
39
information is necessary to trigger the correct event or any event at all; this could
prove to be problematic if the information involves source specific criteria as the source
would be different once it became internal only.
3. Announcement Message: The announcement message generated by a newly
infected system must be a valid broadcast message, but it must also be a custom
message or sequence of messages, or a relatively uncommon message such that the
TB does not incorrectly respond to non-infected systems on a regular basis. In either
case, the broadcast announcement message, once identified, is a signature that can be
used to identify sub-botnet communication; it could even be utilized to identify new
bots and the reigning TB.
4. Token Passing/Management: In many locally switched networks, such as a uni-
versity computer lab, individual systems typically do not communicate heavily with
each other. Thus, the presence of data flows between systems in the switched net-
work may be sign of questionable activity. The TARP process has “circular” message
passing scheme, which is also a signature of the sub-botnet and not something that is
normally seen in network traffic.
As shown above, a sub-botnet communication model has a number of signatures that BotH-
unter sensors can use in order to generate events. Implementing sensors to detect the afore-
mentioned signatures is not trivial, however. Implementing a system that can, at a bare
minimum, relay events to a centralized BotHunter instance needs to be developed before
event generation becomes necessary. The idea is to incorporate a sufficient set of monitor-
ing nodes throughout the network so that sub-botnet activity can be detected. In essence,
the level of protection is directly correlated to the level of monitoring. What this system
requires is a level of monitoring and traffic analysis beyond what is typically done to prevent
current threats.
40
Figure 4.1. Switch coverage issue. Internal-only traffic does not reach the gateway and will
not be seen by BotHunter without some form of internal monitoring points.
4.1.1.2 Monitoring Points
In order to be able to identify all of the sub-botnet communication methods discussed
here, one must implement IDS-capable monitoring at all switch devices in a network. As
illustrated in Figure 4.1, a perimeter-based IDS will not see traffic that does not penetrate
or reach the network’s gateway. Incorporating this level of monitoring may pose a problem
for large networks due to the sheer amount of data being generated. However, as monitor-
ing at the switch-level might be concerned with more specific communication patterns, as




An exploration of the setup of a system capable of detecting sub-botnets is in order.
Such a system requires additional monitoring points and uses signature sharing to detect
internal-only bot traffic. This IDS augmentation presented below only looks at the con-
tent/payload portion of signatures. Section 4.2.1 discusses the drawbacks in more depth.
Figure 4.2 outlines the defense system explained throughout this section.
4.1.2.1 BotHunterPipe (BHPipe)
BotHunter has many built-in modules, and it has a framework in place that allows for
the addition of custom modules. However, the built-in modules are more than sufficient
for adding additional monitoring points to BotHunter. The basic idea is to create another
event/alert input or sensor to feed into BotHunter’s correlation engine. Once this is done, a
centralized BotHunter instance can pipe in events from remote soureces for analysis. BotH-
unter is written in Java, as are the modules. BotHunter has two modules or classes that can
be used rather easily for piping in additional events from remote sources. BotHunter makes
use of a messaging processing system (MPS) as its run-time infrastructure for its correlation
engine. Further, there are two modules that allow for additional information to be fed into
the correlation engine. The modules considered were com.sri.mps.MPSInputModuleServer
and com.sri.mps.MPSInputModuleClient.2 Of the two, MPSInputModuleServer made more
sense, as BotHunter would essentially have its own server socket open and listening for con-
nections, thus allowing remote event sources to connect and disconnect without having to
restart BotHunter. This setup makes more sense than BotHunter acting as a client, espe-
cially since it might be necessary to have multiple remote sources connect to BotHunter at
any given time. This setup also allows BotHunter’s end of things to remain rather generic.
Adding an input server to BotHunter was relatively straightforward; BotHunter makes
use of a file called CTA BotHunter.xml to configure BotHunter and load additional modules.
This is the file that would be modified to change the hard- and soft-pruning thresholds
























Figure 4.2. System setup. Setup of supplemental switch-level monitoring points.
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mentioned in Section 2.1.1. Basically, the system makes a copy of the default configuration
file. It then places the file in BotHunter’s local directory so that changes to it will override
the defaults. The next step is to open up the file and make the necessary changes. Sample
4.1 shows a consolidation of the changes that were made to CTA BotHunter.xml. In reality,
the changes are scattered throughout BotHunter’s configuration file. The file syntax is very
similar to that of a regular .xml file. On line 3, the new Input-Module is added. It makes
use of the built-in class com.sri.mps.MPSInputModuleServer. The new Input-Module is
called “switch input” and is referred to as such throughout the rest of the configuration file.
Comments in Sample 4.1 cover some additional details of MPSInputModuleServer.
The next step is to add the new input, switch input, to BotHunter’s correlator inputs.
This starts on line 19 of Sample 4.1; log input and signal handler were already part of
the log parser, but now switch input has been added. If the code is followed line-by-line,
logically, switch input will now be an input to bh corr inputs. At this point, the system
administrator has wired BotHunter to start a server socket that listens on port 20000 on
the local host. In the future, this configuration could be modified to be available to remote
connections. For the purposes of this project however, the remote input handler resides
on the same machine. Any client that connects to BotHunter’s server socket can now pipe
alerts into BotHunter in much the same way as Snort alerts, and BotHunter’s correlator
processes them.
At this point, a client program connects to BotHunter and handles the task of piping
in alerts. Figure 4.2 shows the client as BHPipe. Theoretically, there could be multiple
instances of BHPipe (or BotHunterPipe), but in the current setup, there is only one. BHPipe
can handle multiple monitor connections. It acts as a liaison between additional monitoring
points and BotHunter, but it is not a monitoring point itself. BHPipe is charged with the
tasks of handling Snort alerts and then passing the rule that generated the alert to the
monitoring points currently reporting to it. This BotHunter client also hands off alerts
generated at the switch monitors to BotHunter for processing. Essentially, BHPipe is a
client/server program that integrates with BotHunter, BotHunter’s Snort, SLADE, SCADE
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Sample 4.1. Modifications to CTA BotHunter.xml
1 <!--Added Input-Module, specifically com.sri.mps.MPSInputModuleServer








10 <!-- Note that com.sri.mps.MPSInputModuleServer is using Defaults for:
11 | Active_Limit (active_limit) = 0 -> any number of concurrent connections
12 | Total_Limit (total_limit) = 0 -> no limit on total overall connections
13 | Listen_Host=‘localhost‘
14 -->
15 <!-- Added switch_input to log_parser‘s inputs
16 | Note that log_parser always feeds bh_corr_inputs, and that
17 | bh_corr_inputs feeds bh_correlator
18 -->
19 <log_parser inputs="log_input,signal_handler,switch_input" />
20 <if expression="batch" />
21 <define bh_corr_inputs="log_parser" />
22 <else />
23 <define bh_corr_inputs="log_parser,reap_timer" />
24 <endif />
25 <bh_correlator inputs="\$bh_corr_inputs" />
instances, and the additional switch-level monitoring points.
BHPipe needed access to the alerts generated by Snort. To this end I created a pipe,
or FIFO queue. The pipe is named tPipe. Next, I modified Snort’s configuration file so
that it could send input to the newly created pipe. This modification appears on line 7
of Sample 4.2. With these modifications in place, Snort was now ready to forward alerts
to BotHunter and BHPipe. BHPipe connects to tPipe and has access to any alerts that
are generated by Snort. Below is an in-depth explanation of what BHPipe does when it
starts up and operates, and how it interacts with the defense system. Futher, Figures 4.3
and 4.4 illustrate the start-up process and operation responsibilities, respectively. First is
a chronological outline of the start-up process:
1. Using a Perl script modified from a script downloaded from [26], load all the rules in
Snort’s BotHunter rule directory.
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Figure 4.3. BHPipe start-up. Basic overview of events that occur as BHPipe initializes.
• As each rule is parsed, the Perl script extracts the signature identification (SID),
the alert message, and the content portion of the rule and writes them to a file;
the content of the temporary file is of the format shown on line 8 of Sample 4.3.
• Once all rules have been parsed, BHPipe reads the temporary file into a C++
map with a <long, string> key-value pair, referred to as the sid map. The key
is the SID, and the string is the entry written to the temporary file. The SID
numbers are unique, and the map structure allows for relatively fast lookup. This
map does a reverse lookup. The SID from the alert generated by Snort retrieves
the content portion of the rule that generated said alert.
2. Connect to tPipe and spawn a thread to listen for alerts from Snort.
3. Connect to BotHunter with a globally (so that all of BHPipe’s threads can access it)
accessible socket.
4. Open a server socket so that remote monitoring points can connect and relay infor-
mation.
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Sample 4.2. Modifications to snort.cta-bh.conf
1 # Send alert-fast ASCII alerts to standard output, used by botHunter
2 # Used by botHunter
3 output alert_fast: stdout
4
5 # Added to send alert-fast ASCII alerts to a pipe call tPipe
6 # Used by BotHunterPipe (BHPipe)
7 output alert_fast: /home/cta-bh/BotHunter/LIVEPIPE_CONFIG/tPipe
Figure 4.4. BHPipe duties. Basic overview of events that occur after BHPipe initializes.
BHPipe is now up and running. It is connected to BotHunter and is receiving alerts
generated by Snort. At any point, a monitoring point can connect to BHPipe and receive
information about the alerts generated by Snort. Section 4.1.2.2 explains in more depth the
monitoring points. BHPipe maintains a list of active monitoring points. It also maintains
the socket the monitoring point is connected to. This is a two way connection, but it is
primarily used to receive information from the monitoring point. BHPipe uses the list of
active monitoring points to do a selective broadcast each time a Snort alert is received
through tPipe that warrants transmission to the monitoring points. The overall duties of
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BHPipe can be broken into two parts:
1. Each time a new monitoring point connects, a new thread is spawned to manage the
socket.
• The monitoring point uses the socket to relay alerts that are triggered to BHPipe.
• When an alert is received from one of BHPipe’s connected monitoring points,
BHPipe forwards the alert to BotHunter’s input server.
2. Each time BHPipe receives a new alert on tPipe, BHPipe spawns a new thread to
manage the alert. The alert is of the form shown on line 4 of Sample 4.3. Notice that
is does not contain specific information about the rule that triggered it. Line 2 of
Sample 4.3 is an example of a Snort rule.
• A lookup into sid map occurs. At this point, either the entry with the corre-
sponding SID is returned, or nothing is returned. If nothing is returned, the
alert does not have a content section. This lookup is done to obtain the content
portion of the rule that triggered that alert. The remote monitoring points use
this information to analyze traffic.
• The retrieved entry is broadcast on a predetermined port to all connected mon-
itoring points.
Essentially, BHPipe keeps the monitoring points separate from BotHunter so that either
end can change implementation without effecting the other. Now that there is a method
for relaying additional information to BotHunter, it becomes necessary to decide what
information or alerts are relayed to BotHunter through BHPipe, and how they will be
generated.
4.1.2.2 Alert/Event Relay System
As shown in Figure 4.2, the monitoring points are implemented using IPFIX. Basically,
the monitoring points are a group of collectors and exporters: the exporters reside on an
IPFIX compliant switch, while the collectors generally reside on a host computer. Table 4.1
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Sample 4.3. BotHunterPipe Rule Handling
1 # Rule that generates alert
2 alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE
Malware Mastermind Related Downloading Daily Executable"; flow:
to_server,established; content:"/soft/loads/"; nocase; within: 5;
content:".exe"; nocase; classtype: trojan-activity; sid:2001412; rev:5; )
3
4 # Actual alert that BotHunter processes
5 9/15/08-17:56:33.179940 [**] [5:2001412:0] E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Malware
Mastermind Related Downloading Daily Executable [**] [Classification: A
Network Trojan was detected] [Priority: 1] {TCP} 192.168.1.107:139 ->
10.0.0.100:80
6
7 # Content of message sent to connected monitoring points || is a delimeter
8 2001412 || E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Malware Mastermind Related Downloading Daily
Executable || .exe || /soft/loads/
shows the overall breakdown of collector/exporter roles. Figure 4.2 shows them as IPFIX
Collector and IPFIX Exporter, respectively. The exporter was modified to enable content
based flow analysis. It checks the payload using a string searching algorithm. The exporter
searches against a queue of the signatures recently forwarded to it, and it periodically
expires old signatures in order to keep the queue manageable. When a packet payload
matches a signature, the exporter generates an alert that is relayed back to BotHunter for
processing, just as if it were generated by BotHunter’s local Snort instance. At this point,
the defense system is capable of detecting sub-botnet traffic using the content portions of
rules from the Snort ruleset. As demonstrated in [2], this system was able to correctly detect
the sub-botnet bots. However, this was done in a very controlled environment where the
exact behavior of the sub-botnet was known, thus allowing for the creation of content-based
signatures. Obviously, such will not always be possible or plausible. The work in this thesis
is a step in the right direction, but is not a complete solution. It still has many failings,
some of which are discussed in the next section.
4.2 Failings of Proposed Defense System
This system is a first attempt at closing the gap between the coverage currently available
and the coverage that is needed. With that said, there are many failings needing to be
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Table 4.1. IPFIX Breakdown
IPFIX Component Description
Collector • One or more instantiations, each can have multiple ex-
porters connect to it
• Charged with:
– Connecting to BHPipe, receiving signature updates
and forwarding these updates to any of its registered
exporters
– Receiving alerts generated by any exporters that are
reporting to it and forwarding these to BHPipe
Exporter • One or more instantiations, generally each one only reports
to one collector
• Charged with:
– Receiving signature updates from a collector
– Analyzing the flows in search of a signature match
– Generating alerts when a signature match is found
and forwarding them to a collector
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addressed before said system would be a viable full coverage IDS.
4.2.1 Snort Ruleset Composition
As mentioned in Chapter 2, BotHunter’s Snort instance makes use of a custom ruleset.
This ruleset is broken down into different E∗ events, namely E1−E8. This project focuses
primarily on a subset of the events, E1 − E5. The other rules deal with specific threats,
and so are less generalized. In the future, they would need to be considered in order to
have a complete detection system, but for the moment E1−E5 will suffice for considering
a potential augmentation of BotHunter’s capabilities.
As mentioned previously, BHPipe is only concerned with forwarding rules that contain
content portions in their definitions. This way, only rules/signature that can be processed
at the switch-level monitoring points are sent to the exporters. However, having a content
portion does not mean the signature can or should be triggered by payload analysis alone.
Unfortunately, this is the case with the current defense system. Table 4.2 shows a sampling
of the rules used by BotHunter’s Snort instance. This sampling covers rules that were
up-to-date as of September 7, 2009. In total, Snort’s ruleset contained 2444 rules, and of
these, it was found that 2023 had content portions, about 83% of the ruleset. However,
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Table 4.3. BotHunter Alerts: 11-19-2008 to 01-27-2009 - An overview of the alerts that
were generated by BotHunter on SRI’s honeynet.
Alerts/Event Total Content-Only
Count Percent Count Percent
E1 0 0.00 0 0.00
E2 31868 32.97 0 0.00
E3 60353 62.43 30491 31.54
E4 392 0.41 0 0.00
E5 296 0.31 0 0.00
E6 3 0.00 0 0.00
E7 0 0.00 0 0.00
E8 0 0.00 0 0.00
Other 3754 3.88 8 0.01
Total 96666 100.00 30499 31.55
about half of these content rules also had other criteria that would have to be met in order
to trigger an alert. This leaves 1060 that were content-only rules or about 42% that could
validly be detected by payload analysis alone. While this is not too bad, it does mean that
the switch-level monitoring points are able to process less than half of the rules potentially
available to them.
Now that it is known that less than half of the rules can be used by the internal mon-
itoring points, an assessment of just how much practical damage this causes is in order.
Especially, of the rules that are usually triggered to detect a bot, how many are content-
only? To this end, I obtained 56 bot profiles from BotHunter’s website. Sample 4.4 shows
an example of the contents of a BotHunter bot profile, in this case a local host compromised
by a Zbot infection. The first line gives the end-user an idea of how confident BotHunter
is that the host is infected. In this case the score is 2.3; there is not a maximum score. It
should be noted that BotHunter considers a score over 0.8 to be a bot. BotHunter does not
generate a profile until the confidence threshold of 0.8 is met. The profiles analyzed were
from live bots that BotHunter detected. Table 4.4 contains findings from an analysis of the
number of rule-triggered alerts generated by BotHunter that were content-only. Thirty, or
about 9%, of the alerts generated were triggered by content-only rules. So, while content-
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Table 4.4. Sampling of Rule Types in 56 Bot Detections
Alerts/Event Total Content-Only
Count Percent Count Percent
E1 0 0.00 0 0.00
E2 47 14.29 0 0.00
E3 77 23.40 30 9.12
E4 64 19.45 0 0.00
E5 20 6.08 0 0.00
E6 64 19.45 0 0.00
E7 0 0.00 0 0.00
E8 57 17.33 0 0.00
Total 329 100.00 30 9.12
only rules allow the internal monitoring points to provide additional coverage, they are far
from a comprehensive solution. Along the same lines, in order to futher assess the success
of the proposed model, I looked at the makeup of alerts that BotHunter generates in a
real world scenario. BotHunter’s developers make available the alerts that are triggered on
their highly interactive honeynet. Table 4.3 contains findings from an analysis of the num-
ber of rule-triggered alerts over a two-month period on the honeynet. About 30499 of the
96666, or 32%, alerts generated were content-only alerts. It follows that while the current
defense system provides additional coverage, it needs additional local network specific rules
to augment its current ruleset.
4.2.2 Redundancy Issues
The proposed system also has various redundancy issues, including signature manage-
ment, or propagation of signatures from BHPipe to the exporters, specifically how often
they are sent and how quickly they expire. The other redundancy issue is due to the nature
of the network structure itself, namely, the fact that switches can be nested. Such nesting
can result in multiple monitoring points reporting the same event.
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Sample 4.4. BotHunter Profile for a ZBot Infection
1 Score: 2.3 (>= 0.8)
2 Infected Target: 192.168.71.146
3 Infector List: <unobserved>
4 Egg Source List: <unobserved>
5 C & C List: 61.135.158.241 (2)
6 Peer Coord. List: <unobserved>
7 Resource List: 192.168.71.2
8 Observed Start: 06/30/2008 23:09:20.623 PDT









18 C and C TRAFFIC
19 61.135.158.241 (2) (23:09:59.459 PDT)
20 event=1:2002400 (2) {tcp} E4[rb] ET MALWARE Suspicious User Agent
(Microsoft Internet Explorer)
21 3013->80 (23:09:59.459 PDT)




26 89.208.66.7 (23:13:37.549 PDT)
27 event=777:7777005 {udp} E5[bh] Detected intense non-malware port scanning
of 30 IPs (28 /24s) (# pkts S/M/O/I=143/96/208/6): 61703u:1, 443:2,
17606u:3, 53u:22, 13557u:1, 19786u:1, 80:19, 3333u:4, 1111u:1,
123u:1, 10489u:1, 2418u:1
28 0->0 (23:13:37.549 PDT)
29 192.168.71.2 (2) (23:09:20.623 PDT)
30 event=777:7777005 (2) {tcp} E5[bh] Detected moderate malware port
scanning of 9 IPs (6 /24s) (# pkts S/M/O/I=9/86/4/6): 137u:71,
138u:15
31 0->0 (23:09:20.623 PDT)
32 0->0 (23:10:56.143 PDT)
33 87.118.110.126 (23:12:01.937 PDT)
34 event=777:7777005 {udp} E5[bh] Detected intense non-malware port scanning
of 30 IPs (28 /24s) (# pkts S/M/O/I=29/92/94/6): 61703u:1, 53u:9,
13557u:1, 19786u:1, 123u:1, 10489u:1, 2418u:1, 54576u:1, 1900u:3,
40568u:1, 80:14, 3571u:1
35 0->0 (23:12:01.937 PDT)
36 ATTACK PREP
37 192.168.71.2 (23:12:03.243 PDT)
38 event=1:2600129 {udp} E6[rb] SPYWARE-DNS DNS lookup 3 chars (.com)
39 3031->53 (23:12:03.243 PDT)
40 DECLARE BOT
41 192.168.71.2 (23:11:22.070 PDT)
42 event=777:7777008 {udp} E8[bh] Detected intense malware port scanning of
21 IPs (18 /24s) (# pkts S/M/O/I=28/89/15/6): 137u:74, 138u:15
43 0->0 (23:11:22.070 PDT)
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4.2.2.1 Switch Coverage
If the traffic that triggered an alert passes through multiple monitoring points, the
proposed defense system does not have a way to manage which switch-level monitoring
point is in charge of reporting the alert. This means that in the current setup, the same
alert is potentially reported to BotHunter multiple times, once for each switch the traffic
passes through, as shown in Figure 4.5. BotHunter still correctly processes the traffic, but
even so, the computing load increases dramatically. There are two possible solutions to this
dilemma. One solution is to only install monitoring point on terminal switch nodes, switches
that only have hosts connected to them. This would be problematic, however, because a
switch’s connections are not guaranteed to be homogeneous. The other solution is to have
the switches intelligently decide which traffic each monitoring point will report. At this
time, this has not been implemented. Futher, this solution likely be complex. Network
makeup can change dynamically, and it would be ideal if the monitoring hierarchy could
change dynamically with it.
4.2.2.2 Rule Expiration and Propagation
There are two major concerns with rule management: how long should a rule be kept in
the exporter’s signature queue and after what timespan should BHPipe resend a signature it
sees multiple times. Currently, BHPipe sends content based alerts every time they are seen,
and the exporters hold onto x signatures, expiring them in first-in-first-out order. Needless
to say, this situation is far from ideal. Basically, resending the same signature more than
is necessary wastes resources. These two issues are somewhat directly related: as the time
that BHPipe waits before repeating the same alerts increases so too must the time that the
exporter holds onto signatures increase. If BHPipe does not report an alert because the
appropriate timespan has not elapsed but the exporters have already pruned said signature
from their queue, events could go undetected. The relationship does not necessarily hold
the other way, however. If the exporters hold onto signatures longer, not changing BHPipe’s
resend timespan does not result in events going undetected. It is wasteful to not match
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Figure 4.5. Monitoring point redundancy issue. The switches in red are the monitoring
points that will be reporting the internal traffic to BotHunter, instead of getting 2 alerts,
BotHunter will get 6.
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them in this case, but not necessarily detrimental to sub-botnet bot detection. Giving the
monitoring point a limited signature base is ideal as far as processing power and memory
consumption are concerned, but not when it comes to guaranteed detection of events. This
is not an easy problem to solve, as time-based expiration only works if matched correctly
and if network traffic, specifically the rate at which alerts are being triggered, stays constant.
4.2.3 Overview
A distributed IDS system has the potential to provide better coverage for the specialized
botnets that are likely to develop as P2P botnets mature. The system discussed is in the
early stages of development and hence is still mainly centralized. Making it a lightweight
system with internal monitoring points requires giving up a little internal protection. Even





The sub-botnet is a potential communication model for covert botnet communica-
tion. This model enables a group of systems within a switched subnet to participate in a
global botnet infrastructure without generating communication patterns that would allow
a perimeter-based monitoring system to identify the compromised hosts. The sub-botnet
was shown to be successful at circumventing current IDSs. While the proposed system can
be detected, it requires an in-depth monitoring infrastructure above what is typical in most
networks. This thesis presents a new defense system designed for better coverage than what
is currently available.
The design and implementation of the sub-botnet resulted from analyzing weaknesses in
current IDSs. Such weaknesses need to be addressed proactively. Security researchers need
analyze current systems for vulnerabilities because malicious parties are already engaged in
such activities. Further, these malicious parties will find these weaknesses, and they will
exploit them. Systems that can exploit those weaknesses need to be designed and tested so
that more robust defense mechanisms can then be created.
The goal is to avoid the cat-and-mouse game, to develop comprehensive solutions to
problems before they arise. It is better to avoid damage in the first instance than to clean
it up after it occurs. Valuable data may not be recoverable; likewise, resources may be
lost or compromised. To this end, this thesis proposes a sub-botnet to take advantage of a
fundamental flaw in perimeter-type IDSs. Once a system was in place that could exploit this
flaw, it was possible to design, implement, and test an IDS that utilized internal monitor
points in order to analyze internal traffic. The new system allows for better coverage than
an IDS without internal monitoring points. The implementation illustrates how lightweight
monitoring points can be matched to a centralized analysis engine in order to minimize
resources required for a monitoring point. The main contributions of this thesis are the
discovery and exploitation of a weakness inherent to current IDS implementations, and the
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development of an IDS that addresses this flaw.
5.2 Future Work
Future work for this project should aim at creating a more comprehensive IDS with
switch-based internal monitoring points. The system will need to enable an IDS to fully
analyze internal traffic in a manner that allows detection of segmented botnets. It is hy-
pothesized that such a system will minimize the logging and computational requirements on
an individual switch monitor and improve the overall accuracy of the system; this remains
to be proven. It should be noted that the monitoring points implemented for the proposed
defense system use string matching techniques to analyze a packet’s payload for signature
matches. Future work could involve adding the ability to analyze flow information and
inspect header information in order to allow for new avenues of bot detection.
Another avenue for exploration involves creating a framework for implementing and
testing new botnet models. The development time of the sub-botnet is too time consuming
to be a viable means for testing other botnet models. A testing framework designed to
allow parameterization of botnet characteristics would speed up the development process.
Such a framework needs to be flexible enough for other new botnet models to be easily
implemented and even modified on-the-fly. This framework could then act as an efficient
testbed for designing more robust defensive systems. It would be much easier to implement
botnets and other malware that exploit current weaknesses if the entity in question did not
have to be built from the ground up. This, in turn, would allow for much faster gestation of a
defense system that could account for the new malware variant’s anti-detection mechanisms.
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